Until Thursday afternoon, there had been areassuring sense of restrained, tit-for-tatreciprocity in the trade skirmish between theUnited States and China.
截至周四下午，美國與中國的貿(mào)易沖突仍有一種令人放心的、有節(jié)制的以牙還牙的感覺。
But if this spirals into a bigger conflict between theworld’s two biggest economies — something thatseemed to become more likely Thursday evening withPresident Trump’s threat to add $100 billion more intariffs — it’s worth keeping something in mind: In atrade war, the usual rules of commerce may not apply.
但如果情況失去控制，導(dǎo)致世界上兩個最大經(jīng)濟體之間發(fā)生一場更大沖突的話，有件事情值得銘記于心：在一場貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中，通常的商業(yè)規(guī)則可能不再適用。隨著周四晚上特朗普總統(tǒng)威脅要把征收關(guān)稅的中國商品價值再擴大1000億美元，沖突升級的可能性看來變得更大。
That is doubly true in a potential trade war with China, for several reasons.
在與中國潛在的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中更是如此，原因有幾個。
Because the country exports far more in goods to the United States than it imports, Chinasimply doesn’t have as much room to keep up with escalating American tariffs, especially giventhe Chinese government’s desire to cushion its citizens from higher prices for food staples.
由于中國對美國出口的商品遠多于進口的商品，中國沒有足夠多的進口商品可征稅，以達到不斷升級的美國征收的關(guān)稅的水平，尤其是考慮到中國政府不想讓國內(nèi)的人受到食品價格上漲的影響。
Moreover, China has in the past proved willing to use a wide range of government powers toachieve commercial objectives — from campaigns against out-of-favor companies in statemedia to selective, stepped-up regulatory enforcement. And if things really get nasty, theUnited States and China are financially intertwined in ways that China could seek to exploit — though not without creating risks for a country holding $1.2 trillion in United States Treasurybonds.
此外，過去已有事實證明，中國愿意使用廣泛的政府權(quán)力來實現(xiàn)商業(yè)目標(biāo)——從使用官方媒體抨擊失寵企業(yè)，到選擇性地加強監(jiān)管執(zhí)法。如果情況真的變糟，中國可能會尋找美國與中國在經(jīng)濟上密切相關(guān)的方式加以利用，盡管對于一個持有1.2萬億美元美國國債的中國來說，這樣做并非沒有風(fēng)險。
“One of the very important tools that the Chinese have is the ability to make life difficult for alarge number of American businesses,” said Eswar Prasad, an economist at Cornell Universitywho studies Chinese economic relations. “They have all of these unconventional weapons thatare not covered by traditional trading rules that could be potent weapons in actually fighting atrade war.”
“中國擁有的非常重要的工具之一，是讓大量的美國企業(yè)在中國的日子不好過，”康奈爾大學(xué)(CornellUniversity)研究中國經(jīng)濟關(guān)系的經(jīng)濟學(xué)家埃斯瓦爾·普拉薩德(Eswar Prasad)說�！八麄冇兴羞@些不受傳統(tǒng)交易規(guī)則管轄的非常規(guī)性武器，這些武器在真打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)時可能會很有效�！�
The details of what China might do are speculative. Thus far, China’s government has reactedto new tariff actions by the Trump administration with relatively restrained words andpromises of proportional responses to the American government’s actions.
對于中國可能采取的措施的細節(jié)，目前只能進行推測。迄今為止，中國政府對特朗普政府征收新關(guān)稅的宣布所做出的回應(yīng)相對克制，只承諾要對美國政府的行動做出相應(yīng)的回應(yīng)。
The Americans put tariffs on steel and aluminum; China responds by taxing American pork. The Trump administration’s plans to tax $50 billion worth of Chinese imports is met withthreats by the Chinese to subject $50 billion worth of American products to the same.
美國宣布對鋼鐵和鋁征收關(guān)稅；中國宣布對美國豬肉征收關(guān)稅作為回應(yīng)。特朗普政府要對價值500億美元的中國進口商品征收關(guān)稅的計劃，得到了中國政府要對500億美元的等值美國產(chǎn)品征收同樣關(guān)稅的威脅。
Those tariffs won’t even go into effect until after a comment period, setting up a potentiallylong period of lobbying and negotiation that could rein in their scope or even delay themindefinitely.
這些關(guān)稅要在一個評論期過后才會生效，可能會引發(fā)一個長時間的游說和談判的努力，讓關(guān)稅征收的范圍縮小，甚至讓一些關(guān)稅被無限期推遲。
But just because matters have been calibrated thus far doesn’t mean they will stay that way. American financial markets have been swinging wildly in recent weeks as investors revise theirpredictions for what might come next.
但僅僅因為迄今為止的做法比較克制，并不意味著會永遠這樣下去。最近幾周，隨著投資者修正他們對未來可能發(fā)生情況的預(yù)測，美國金融市場一直在劇烈波動。
The Tough Math of Tit-for-Tat
以牙還牙的困難計算
As President Trump often notes, the United States does run a large trade deficit with China — especially if you look only at goods, and don’t count the value of services. That means that ifChina seeks to match tariffs on goods — a classic tit-for-tat approach — China runs out of “tats” pretty quickly.
正如特朗普總統(tǒng)經(jīng)常指出的那樣，美國確實對中國存在巨大的貿(mào)易逆差——尤其是如果只看商品，而不考慮服務(wù)的價值的話。這就意味著，如果中國試圖對同等價值的商品征收關(guān)稅的話——這是典型的以牙還牙的做法——中國的“牙”很快會不夠用。
In 2017, the United States imported $506 billion in goods from China while exporting only $131 billion in goods to China, according to data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
美國經(jīng)濟分析局(Bureau of Economic Analysis)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2017年，美國從中國進口了價值5060億美元的商品，但只向中國出口了價值1310億美元的商品。
“It mathematically means that China can’t match the U.S. dollar for dollar,” said Brad Setser, asenior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
“這意味著在商品價值上，中國無法與美國針鋒相對，”美國外交關(guān)系委員會(Council on Foreign Relations)高級研究員布拉德·塞策(Brad Setser)說。
So, for example, if the Trump administration follows through on the president’s suggestion toconsider expanding the tariffs to cover $100 billion more of goods, it would strain the Chinesegovernment to respond in a dollar-for-dollar manner.
因此，比方說如果特朗普政府按照總統(tǒng)的建議去做，考慮把征收關(guān)稅商品的范圍再擴大1000億美元的話，將會讓中國政府作出同等價值的回應(yīng)變得很勉強。
And that’s before you account for the Chinese government’s reluctance to put tariffs ongoods that might carry some political or strategic cost.
而且這是在考慮到中國政府不愿對可能帶來政治或戰(zhàn)略代價的商品征收關(guān)稅之前。
For example, in its planned retaliatory tariffs, the Chinese government included narrow-bodyaircraft but not wide-body aircraft. This makes sense strategically, Mr. Setser argued, becauseonly two companies in the world make wide-body planes: Boeing and Airbus. If China put atariff on planes from the American Boeing but not the European Airbus, it would lose leveragewith Airbus with which to extract favorable prices and access to cutting-edge technology.
舉例來說，在征收報復(fù)性關(guān)稅的計劃中，中國政府把窄體飛機包括了進去，但沒有包括寬體飛機。塞策認(rèn)為，這在戰(zhàn)略上有道理，因為世界上只有兩家公司生產(chǎn)寬體飛機：波音(Boeing)和空客(Airbus)。如果中國對美國波音公司的飛機征收關(guān)稅，但不對歐洲空客的飛機征收關(guān)稅的話，中國將失去為得到優(yōu)惠價格、獲得尖端技術(shù)與空客談判的籌碼。
China has already imposed tariffs on the easy stuff: luxury goods like American wine and liquor, and agricultural goods that are considered luxuries within China, like almonds and pistachios. Itis unlikely there will be uprisings in the streets of Shanghai if Kentucky bourbon gets moreexpensive.
中國已經(jīng)對容易的商品征收關(guān)稅：像美國葡萄酒和烈性酒這樣的奢侈品，以及中國視為奢侈品的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品，譬如杏仁和開心果。如果只是肯塔基波旁威士忌變得更貴的話，上海的大街上不太可能出現(xiàn)暴動。
But in the latest round, China has said it will raise tariffs on American soybeans. That is likely tocause President Trump political problems in farm states, but it also risks raising food costswithin China. It’s a fair bet, then, that China views remaining options as even more problematicfor the prices of staple goods or the country’s industrial strategy.
但是在最近一輪中，中國表示將提高對美國大豆的關(guān)稅。這可能會讓美國總統(tǒng)特朗普在農(nóng)業(yè)州遇到政治問題，但這也可能提高中國國內(nèi)的食品價格。因此可以合理地預(yù)測，中國認(rèn)為剩下的選擇會給主要商品的價格或國家產(chǎn)業(yè)戰(zhàn)略帶來更多的問題。
In other words, for China the low-hanging fruit is gone. If this trade battle continues toescalate, China will have to bear a greater cost.
換句話說，對于中國來說，容易摘的果子已經(jīng)沒了。如果這場貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)繼續(xù)升級，中國將不得不承擔(dān)更大的代價。
Commercial Guerrilla Warfare
商業(yè)游擊戰(zhàn)爭
That reality could push China to seek other buttons to press. And while there is no recentprecedent of a trade war to draw from, the Chinese government’s actions in other types ofdisputes offer a potential road map.
這個現(xiàn)實可能迫使中國尋找其他的應(yīng)對方式。雖然沒有最近的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)可以作為先例，但中國政府在其它類型的爭端中的做法為此提供了一個可能的路線圖。
For one thing, American companies do significant business in China that doesn’t show up intrade data. When Apple assembles an iPhone in Zhengzhou and sells it in Shanghai, thatdoesn’t count as international trade, though the profits accrue to the benefit of a California-based company. The Chinese government has any number of tools to try to weaken thatbusiness if it wishes. It could decide that phones made by a foreign company are a nationalsecurity threat, or shut down plants because of minor regulatory problems.
首先，美國公司在中國有相當(dāng)部分的業(yè)務(wù)并沒有在貿(mào)易數(shù)據(jù)中表現(xiàn)出來。蘋果公司(Apple)的iPhone在鄭州組裝、在上海賣出，這并不算國際貿(mào)易，雖然利潤被一家總部位于加州的公司所獲得。如果中國政府愿意的話，它有很多可以試圖用來削弱這種生意的工具。政府可以決定，外國公司生產(chǎn)的手機是對國家安全的威脅，或者可以因為小的監(jiān)管問題而關(guān)閉工廠。
“That’s the kind of thing they could reduce dramatically if they wanted to,” said Nicholas Lardy, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “To their credit, they havenot hinted that this is on their agenda, and they seem to be sticking to this idea, that theirresponse will be reciprocal and not escalatory. But they have plenty of other options.”
“如果他們想做的話，他們可以大大減少這類業(yè)務(wù)，”彼得森國際經(jīng)濟研究所(Peterson Institute forInternational Economics)高級研究員尼古拉斯·拉迪(Nicholas Lardy)說�！爸档觅潛P的是，他們沒有暗示這在他們的計劃之中，而且他們似乎堅持的觀點是，他們的回應(yīng)是一報還一報，而不是升級。不過，他們還有很多其他的選擇�！�
Making life difficult for American companies in China as retaliation in a trade war need not beformal and widely publicized. American automakers who make cars in China might find theirlocal joint-venture partners squeezing them out. Regional governments might send safetyinspectors to plants of American companies so often as to disrupt production.
讓美國公司在中國的日子不好過，把這作為貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中的報復(fù)做法不需要正式宣布，也不需要廣泛宣傳。在中國制造汽車的美國汽車制造商可能會發(fā)現(xiàn)，他們在當(dāng)?shù)氐暮腺Y伙伴要將他們擠出市場。地方政府可能會頻繁派遣安全檢查員到美國公司的工廠去檢查，以致于生產(chǎn)被打亂。
There are more public options, too. For example, in 2013, Chinese state media accused JaguarLand Rover and Audi of overcharging buyers for car parts, which analysts viewed as part of acampaign to pressure those automakers to locate more manufacturing in China.
還有更多的公開選擇。比如，2013年，中國官方媒體指責(zé)捷豹路虎(Jaguar Land Rover)和奧迪(Audi)對汽車零部件的買家要價過高。分析師認(rèn)為，那是在向這些汽車制造商施壓，讓它們把更多的制造工作搬到中國去。
Bruising in the Bond Market?
在債券市場上遇挫？
For years, American politicians have fretted about China’s role as the United States’ largestcreditor; the nation has accumulated a huge stockpile of Treasury bonds over the last 20 years.
多年以來，美國政客一直擔(dān)心中國作為美國最大債權(quán)國的角色；在過去的20年里，中國積累了大量的美國國債。
Could China use its role as No. 1 lender to exert pressure in a trade war?
中國是否會利用其第一債權(quán)人的角色，在一場貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中對美國施加壓力呢？
It would be a risky maneuver, in which China itself would potentially have much to lose. But itcan’t be ruled out.
這將是一個冒險的策略，這樣做可能會給中國本身帶來很大的損失。但不能排除這種可能性。
If China were to suddenly unload some of its holdings, or even signal an intention to buyfewer dollar assets in the future, that would probably cause long-term interest rates in theUnited States to rise, at least temporarily. And this would cause some pain in the UnitedStates, as borrowing costs — whether for the federal government or individual home buyers — would rise.
如果中國突然拋售所持的部分債券，或者只是暗示有意在未來購買更少的美元資產(chǎn)，可能會導(dǎo)致美國的長期利率上升，至少是暫時的上升。這將給美國帶來一些痛苦，因為這會導(dǎo)致借貸成本上升，無論對聯(lián)邦政府還是個人購房者來說。
But it would also drive down the value of China’s existing bond portfolio, meaning China couldlose billions. And it would tend to push down the value of the dollar relative to other currencies, which would actually help the United States attain more advantageous trade terms.
但這也會讓中國目前持有的債券投資組合的價值降低，這意味著中國可能要損失數(shù)十億美元。而且，這會降低美元相對于其他貨幣的比價，實際上幫助美國獲得更有利的貿(mào)易條件。
Even after all that, bond prices would most likely readjust over time as other buyers tookadvantage of the rise in interest rates. In the medium term, the performance of the UnitedStates economy and actions of the Federal Reserve do more to determine bond prices thanthe decisions of a single buyer or seller, even one as large as China.
即使在這之后，債券價格很可能會隨著時間的推移而重新調(diào)整，因為其他買家會利用利率上升的有利條件。從中期來看，美國經(jīng)濟的表現(xiàn)和美聯(lián)儲的行動對決定債券價格所起的作用，比單個債權(quán)人的決定大得多，即使這個債權(quán)人有中國這么大。
That doesn’t mean there isn’t room to cause some near-term pain and disruption. “The Chinesehave some leverage to rattle U.S. bond markets, even if the threat of substantive action isnot very credible,” Mr. Prasad said.
這并不意味著短期內(nèi)沒有制造一些痛苦和混亂的余地�！凹词共扇嵸|(zhì)性行動的威脅不太可信，中國也有一些能擾亂美國債券市場的籌碼，”普拉薩德說。
Given that a trade war with such a major trading partner is without precedent in moderntimes, we don’t really know what it would look like. But it’s a safe bet that Chinese officials arealready thinking through their options in case that is where the latest round of economic saberrattling ultimately leads.
考慮到與一個如此重要的貿(mào)易伙伴的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)在現(xiàn)代歷史上沒有先例，我們真的不知道它會是什么樣。但可以肯定的是，中國官員已經(jīng)在認(rèn)真考慮他們的選項，以防最新這一輪經(jīng)濟上的相互威脅最終走到貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的地步。
